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1 Introduction
In this paper, a simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature
and K · S ¯rms |and thus potentially incomplete markets| is studied. There is only
one good, and the agents (consumers/shareholders) are characterized by utility functions
exhibiting some quadratic feature and indexed by a probability vector ¼ in the (S ¡ 1){
dimensional simplex, ¢S, that we call the type of the agent. Agents' types are supposed
to be distributed, according a continuous measure with density f over ¢S, and are only
endowed with initial shares of the K ¯rms. Since there is no consumption in period zero,
¯rms are taken to be assets which allocate a certain mass of the good across states in
period one.
Rates of super majority rule ½ are computed which guarantee the existence of ½{
majority stable production equilibria. The interpretation follows. Given initially an-
nounced production plans, a general equilibrium is computed: agents choose their optimal
portfolio given the market prices, and equilibrium prices for shares occur that clear the
markets. This production equilibrium is shown to be ½{majority stable in the natural
following sense: within each ¯rm, the production plans of other ¯rms remaining ¯xed, no
alternative production plan can rally a proportion bigger than ½ of the shareholders, or
shares, against the equilibrium.
These rates of super majority rule are computed (1) under various governances, both
of the `one person-one vote' and `one share-one vote' types, and (2) when the considered
shares are the initial (pre-trade) shares or the equilibrium (post-trade) shares. Conditions
are given under which these rates are smaller than Caplin and Nalebu® (1988, 1991) bound
of 64%. Moreover, it is shown that simple majority production equilibria exist for any
initial distribution of types when K = S ¡ 1, and for symmetric distributions of types as
soon as K ¸ S=2. Thus, even with a high degree of market incompleteness, a production
equilibrium exists against which, within each ¯rm, no alternative production plan can
rally more than half of the shareholders, or shares.
The early motivation of this paper is to study whether collective choice mechanisms
among the society of shareholders |and in particular the simplest one: majority voting|
can help de¯ning or qualifying the objective of the ¯rm in a context of incomplete markets.
The latter concept has received a lot of interest in the recent years [see, e.g., Citanna and
Villanacci (1997), Dierker, Dierker and Grodal (1999) and BettzÄuge and Hens (2000)].
In the present setup, the objective of a ¯rm is not investigated from the perspective
of e±ciency or maximization of some shareholder's value or pro¯t function [as in Drµeze
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(1974), Grossman and Hart (1979)], but from the point of view of stability with respect
to collective decision making among shareholders [as in Drµeze (1987, 1989), DeMarzo
(1993)], under di®erent types of governance.
The results proposed tend to show that market equilibria exist which are stable with
respect to simple and quite operational collective decision mechanisms (here: voting rules
with reasonable rates of super majority), even when the degree of market incompleteness
can be considered `high'. Moreover the less incomplete the markets the smaller the rate
of super majority necessary to guarantee the existence of stable general equilibria. Al-
though these intuitive ¯ndings are obtained in a simple setup, it is certainly valuable to
have positive results of robust existence of majority majority stable production equilibria.
Especially given the fact that the Social Choice literature is perceived as being dominated
by impossibility results and considered useless for a general theory of decision in ¯rms.
In standard general equilibrium models of production in a context of incomplete mar-
kets [see, e.g., Magill and Quinzii (1996), Du±e and Shafer (1988) and Geanakoplos,
Magill, Quinzii and Drµeze (1990)], the ¯nancial structure is usually more complex than
the one presented here. And the di±culty in de¯ning an objective function for a ¯rm
stems from the fact that, at equilibrium, shareholders can disagree on the present value
of the production plans that are not in the span of the ¯nancial structure: to discount
future income streams, they use shadow prices that can be di®erent. These shadow prices
are endogeneous whereas in the present paper, they are basically always pointing toward
the ideal security which is exogeneously ¯xed, by assumption on the utility functions.
There is nevertheless a way the present paper can shed some light on the debate on
which objective function the ¯rm should optimize in the context of incomplete markets.
Firm should make choices that are supported by shareholders, and the most commonly
suggested behavior for the ¯rm is that it should use the average of the shareholders'
normalized present value vector, where the weights for averaging are the shares of share-
holders: a `mean' shareholder is thus de¯ned for each ¯rm. If the latter shares are the
initial shares, it is the Grossman-Hart criterion, if they are the equilibrium shares, it is the
Drµeze criterion. The present paper gives some insights that these two criteria are likely
to give rise to majority stable production equilibria (see Section 4). The main result of
this paper is that there exist production equilibria such that the K mean shareholders1 can
exactly span their type and generate their ideal security (the one they would demand if
markets were complete); moreover these are the most stable equilibria. It is worth noticing
1Of course, in Drµeze's case, as opposed to Grossman-Hart's, the mean shareholder is endogeneously
determined at equilibrium.
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that the assumptions under which this result holds are weaker in the case of a governance
µa la Drµeze.
This result has no direct link with the above-mentioned criteria since the announced
production plan of a ¯rm does not have to be the optimal production plan of its mean
shareholder. But the collection of K production plans (called a multiplan) should be
such that their span contains the ideal security of all mean shareholders; in some way
the multiplan is optimal for the K mean shareholders. Then the production equilibria
are stable for the lowest possible rates of super majority. Lastly, the present paper does
not study the question of optimality or constrained optimality of the stable equilibria
it describes, a subject lying at the core of the literature on production in a context of
incomplete markets. Especially, it does not pursue the study of Dierker, Dierker and
Grodal (1999) on the relation between majority voting and welfare considerations2.
Technically, the main results of the present paper are based on those in Caplin and
Nalebu® (1988, 1991). Indeed, the case where agents are distributed over ¢S and there
is only one ¯rm (K = 1, and then no exchange of shares), is a sub-case of Caplin and
Nalebu® (1988, 1991). And of course we get here: ½ = 1 ¡ 1=e ¼ 0:632. But although
some assumptions are less general than those in Caplin and Nalebu® (1988, 1991), the
setup is di®erent, and more general in at least one dimension3. It is more general to the
extent that the number of assets can be bigger than one. It is di®erent to the extent
that there is an upstream market mechanism, with equilibrium prices clearing markets
for shares. Consequently there is an endogeneous allocation of shares and therefore an
endogeneous distribution over types for governances µa la Drµeze. In the present setup, the
collective choice mechanism is intertwined with a general equilibrium market mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and provides some
preliminary results founding the analysis. Section 3 focuses on the canonical case where
agents are described through characteristics that are uniformly distributed over ¢S; exact
computations are provided illustrating how the less incomplete the markets the smaller
the required rates of super majority. Section 4 discusses the generalization of the results
obtained in the previous section: Caplin and Nalebu® (1988, 1991) general upper bound of
64% for the rate of super majority is shown to hold in case the distributions of character-
istics ful¯ll some conditions of concavity (Proposition 3 and Theorem 3); simple majority
2Dierker, Dierker and Grodal (1999) show through an example that majority voting and welfare
considerations can be completely unrelated.
3Actually, Caplin and Nalebu® (1991) gives, as an illustration for a possible application of their theory,
the example of voting among shareholders in a context of incomplete markets.
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stable production equilibria are shown to exist under some assumptions of symmetry of
the distributions of characteristics (Proposition 2) or when the degree of market incom-
pleteness is just one (Theorem 2). Appendix A proposes some comments; in particular,
through parametric examples, these rates are shown to decrease with the homogeneity of
the shareholders' types, and to increase with the shareholders' pessimism. All technical
proofs are gathered in Appendix B and Appendix C.
2 The model
Consider an economy with two periods, t = 0; 1 and S states of nature in period 1, indexed
by s, s = 1; : : : ; S. There is one good, and a continuum of agents, each agent is indexed
by probability vector ¼ = (¼s)Ss=1 which will be interpreted as his ideal security once the
utility functions ar introduced. The agent's type ¼ is thus taken in the (S¡1)-dimensional
simplex:
¢S =
(
¼ = (¼1; ¼2; : : : ; ¼S) 2 RS+ j
SX
s=1
¼s = 1
)
:
Agents' types are assumed to be distributed over ¢S according to a continuous, atomless
density function f : ¢S ¡! R+ . Consumption takes place in period one but must be
decided in period zero. Agent ¼ is characterized by a utility function: U¼[x(¼)], where
x(¼) = [x1(¼); : : : ; xS(¼)] is agent ¼'s consumption in period 1. Since there is only one
good, it will be sometimes better to give a ¯nancial interpretation to x(¼) as an income
vector. Utility functions are of a quadratic/`euclidean' type, described at the end of this
section.
There are K ¯rms indexed by k, k = 1; : : : ; K. All ¯rms have the same production
technology, represented for the simplicity of the analysis by the span of ¢S:
h¢Si =
(
y = (y1; y2; : : : ; yS) 2 RS j
SX
s=1
ys = 1
)
:
Agent ¼ is endowed with initial shares of the K ¯rms: µ0(¼) = [µ0k(¼)]Kk=1. He is then
totally characterized by the vector [¼; µ0(¼)]. The function µ0 : ¢S ¡! RK+ is taken
continuous and positive over ¢S.
A ¯rm is basically an asset which allocates an initial mass ¡0k =
Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼
of the good across states in period 1. We do not normalize it to one to allow di®erent
¯rms to be of di®erent `sizes': the yield, in terms of consumption/income, of ¯rm k in
period 1 in case state s occurs is: ¡0k ysk. To avoid some minor technical di±culties, it
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is preferable not to impose sign constraints on production plans; this is ¯ne within the
¯nancial interpretation of the model. Although it is abusive to talk about ¯rms in such
a simple framework, and better to talk about securities, we stick to this terminology and
rely on the forgiveness of the reader.
Maximization program of the agents
Given an announced production plan yk by each ¯rm (hence an announced multi-plan
Y = (yk)Kk=1, where all yk's are taken di®erent) and a vector of prices q = (qk)Kk=1 for
the shares, each agent maximizes his utility by choosing the optimal vector of shares4
µ(¼) = [µk(¼)]Kk=1 and the optimal consumption plan x(¼) according to the maximization
program M(¼):
max
[µ(¼);x(¼)]
U¼[x(¼)]
s. t.
KX
k=1
qk
h
µk(¼) ¡ µ0k(¼)
i
= 0 (1)
and x(¼) =
KX
k=1
µk(¼) yk (2)
This is of course equivalent to ~M(¼):
max
µ(¼)
~U¼;Y [µ(¼)]
s. t.
KX
k=1
qk
h
µk(¼) ¡ µ0k(¼)
i
= 0
where ~U¼;Y [µ(¼)] = U¼
Ã KX
k=1
µk(¼) yk
!
.
Majority Stable Production Equilibrium
Given the individual demand functions for shares, an equilibrium price will clear the
market for shares.
De¯nition 1 A Production Equilibrium (PE) is a vector E = (Y; q; µ(¼)) such that indi-
vidual optimization (C1), and market clearing (C2), are satis¯ed:
(C1) Given (Y; q), for all ¼, [µ(¼)] solves the maximization program ~M(¼);
(C2) For all k,
Z
¢S
f(¼) µk(¼) d¼ =
Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼ (= ¡
0
k) .
4The choice has been made here not to impose short-sell constraints on the µ's. The aim is to prove
existence of majority stable production equilibria, and the paper is mostly going to focus on equilibria
such that µ(¼) > 0 for all ¼.
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For a ¯rm k, given a PE E , a distribution of voting weights ´ : ¢S ¡! RK+ (´ ´ µ0
or µ), and two production plans (yk; zk), denote IE;´(yk) the subset of agents ¼ endowed
with a positive voting weight5 in ¯rm k (i.e., agents such that ´k(¼) ¸ 0), and denote
IE;´(zk; yk) [½ IE;´(yk)] the subset of agents ¼ endowed with a positive voting weight in
¯rm k who prefer zk to yk, i.e., such that
´k(¼) ¸ 0 and U¼ [x(¼) + µk(¼)(zk ¡ yk)] ¸ U¼[x(¼)] ;
where x(¼) is de¯ned through equations (2). De¯ne:
PE;´(zk; yk) =
Z
IE;´(zk;yk)
f(¼) d¼Z
IE;´(yk)
f(¼) d¼
and AE;´(zk; yk) =
Z
IE;´(zk;yk)
f(¼) ´k(¼) d¼Z
IE;´(yk)
f(¼) ´k(¼) d¼
;
respectively the fraction of shareholders (with voting rights) and the fraction of vote shares
who prefer zk to yk. De¯ne moreover
PE;´(yk) = sup
zk2¢S
PE;´(zk; yk) and AE;´(yk) = sup
zk2¢S
AE;´(zk; yk)
the maximal fractions (resp. of the shareholders/shares, with voting rights) against yk.
De¯nition 2 For any real ½ 2 [0; 1], a ½{Majority Stable Production Equilibrium under
² the `one person-one vote, pre-trade' governance (in short, a ½{MSPEp0) is a PE E
such that for all k, PE;µ0(yk) · ½ ;
² the `one person-one vote, post-trade' governance (½{MSPEp1) is a PE E such that
for all k, PE;µ(yk) · ½ ;
² the `one share-one vote, pre-trade' governance (½{MSPEa0), is a PE E such that
for all k, AE;µ0(yk) · ½ ;
² the `one share-one vote, post-trade' governance (½{MSPEa1), is a PE E such that
for all k, AE;µ(yk) · ½ :
For ½ = 1=2, such an equilibrium is a simple{Majority Stable Production Equilibrium (or
s-MSPE).
5Only such agents have the right to vote in the present setup.
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Remark: The p0 and p1-governance are not distinct as soon as everybody is positively
endowed with shares of all ¯rms, both initially and at equilibrium. This will be mostly
the case in the present paper. It is clear that the most interesting governance is the
a1-governance. Nevertheless, there is some di±culty in de¯ning a ½{Majority Stable Pro-
duction Equilibrium for the a1-governance since the number of post-trade shares with
voting rights,
Z
IY;µ(yk)
f(¼) µk(¼) d¼, is endogeneous and can be bigger than the initial
allocation of shares, ¡0k, in case part of the agents choose to be short on k's stock market6.
But we will concentrate in this paper on production equilibria where all agents are allo-
cated positive post-trade shares. For other production equilibria, one can consider that
the excess number of shares is allocated in a continuous way (i.e., according to f and µ0)
to all other shareholders, which does not introduce much distorsion in the model.
The concept of ½{majority stable equilibrium (for K = 1) is linked to the Simpson-
Kramer min-max majority [see Simpson (1969), Kramer (1977)]. In the present paper
the concept is built to hold for K ¸ 1: min-max majorities for production equilibria are
(resp., for each governance):
½¤p0 = infPE (Y;q;µ)maxk PY;µ
0(yk) , ½¤p1 = infPE (Y;q;µ)maxk PY;µ(yk)
½¤a0 = infPE (Y;q;µ)maxk PY;µ
0(yk) and ½¤a1 = infPE (Y;q;µ)maxk PY;µ(yk)
:
Assumptions on the utility functions U¼
The utility functions U¼ are de¯ned on RS and assumed to satisfy the two following sets
of assumptions:
² Assumption (A) : U¼ is increasing, strictly quasi concave, continuously di®erentiable
and homothetic;
² Assumption (E) : The indi®erences surfaces of U¼ cut h¢Si through hyperspheres
centered on ¼.
Taking homothetic utility functions will allow to focus on consumptions in h¢Si (since
we'll only consider PE with7 q = 1K, see next subsection). Assumption (E) (said to be
the `euclidean' assumption) is more problematic: it is standard in Social Choice theory,
6In fact, the stock repurchase plans that some ¯rms implement might be considered as introducing
some type of endogeneity in the total numbers of shares.
7Notation: q = 1K stands for qk = 1; all k.
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and taken for purely technical reasons. The motivation behind this assumption is the
following: when asked whether they agree with an in¯nitesimal change8 u 2 RS in the
production plan of ¯rm k, indi®erent shareholders should be on a hyperplane in ¢S. It is
nevertheless clear that such utility functions exhibit some form of quadratic feature, an
such features are regularly assumed in the ¯nance literature, e.g., in the CAPM.
When there is only one ¯rm (K = 1) as in Caplin and Nalebu® (1988, 1991), it is
enough to take utility functions of the separable form:
U¼[x(¼)] =
SX
s=1
¼s vs[xs(¼)] : (3)
In that case, the type ¼ is the subjective probability of the agent over states of nature.
The fact that the elementary utility functions are common across the population secures
the needed condition [see Grandmont (1978)]. The reason is simple to see: when K = 1,
x(¼) = y1 is independent of ¼; and for any in¯nitesimal change u 2 RS in the produc-
tion plan, shareholders indi®erent to the proposed change are described by the equationP
s ¼susDvs[y1] = 0 which de¯nes a hyperplane. If K > 1, shareholders indi®erent to
an in¯nitesimal change u in the production plan of ¯rm k are described by the equationP
s ¼susDvs[¹xs(¼)] = 0, where ¹xs(¼) stands for the optimal consumption of agent ¼, and
di®ers across ¼. For instance, in the log-linear case where vs ´ ln, the latter equation
almost never de¯nes a hyperplane in ¢S. But some of the results proposed in the paper
are valid with utility functions of the form (3); this discussion is posponed to Section 4.4.
A last di±culty is to avoid negative consumptions/incomes. We basically discard this
problem: (i) in case the utility functions are of the separable form (3), by assuming that
vs satis¯es the Inada conditions: lim
x¡!0Dv
s(x) = +1; (ii) in case the utility functions
satisfy assumption (E), by endowing the agents with an appropriate quantity, x0(¼), of
the consumption good, whatever the occuring state of nature9.
The Pareto criterion
Among all production equilibria, we will restrict our attention to those that respect the
Pareto criterion: an eligible production plan for majority stability should be such that
8As already written in the introduction, the assumption of concavity of the individual utility functions
entails that the most challenging production plans are in¯nitesimally close to the staus quo; see Lemma
2 in Appendix B. Therefore, a challenger is basically an in¯nitesimal change u in the production plan,
with, given the technological constraints,
P
s u
s = 0.
9Since we will only consider multiplans Y which spans a hyperplane having a non-empty intersection
with ¢S , a uniform upper bound can be found on x0(¼), for all ¼.
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there does not exist an alternative production plan preferred by all shareholder endowed
with a voting right (i.e., endowed with a positive quantity of shares). The following
observation shows that, in the present framework, a necessary and su±cient condition is
that stock prices be all equal10.
Observation 1 A PE (Y; q; µ) satis¯es the Pareto criterion if and only if q = 1K.
Proof: Consider a PE (Y; q; µ) such that q 6= 1K. Consider two ¯rms, k and j, such
that qk > qj ; then there exists an alternative anounced production plan zk unanimously
prefered to yk by agents positively endowed with shares of ¯rm k. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that q1 > q2. At the PE (Y; q; µ), the gradient of U¼[x(¼)] with respect to
µ(¼) is colinear to q. Given q1 > q2, this entails that for all ¼: DU¼[x(¼)] ¢ (y1 ¡ y2) > 0.
Consider z1 = y1 + ²(y1 ¡ y2), we then have, for ² small enough and for all ¼, U¼[x(¼) +
µ1(¼)(z1 ¡ y1)] > U¼[x(¼)] if µ1(¼) > 0. Hence for the `if' part of the assertion. The `only
if' part is obviously true. 2
In the sequel of the paper, we'll de¯ne a Pareto production equilibrium as a PE with unit
prices: (Y;1K; µ).
Denote hY i the vectorial subspace, in h¢Si, spanned by Y . At a PE with unit prices,
the optimal choice of an agent is |up to multiplication by a scalar, given assumption
(A)| the point of tangency between hY i and the sections by h¢Si of the agent's indi®er-
ence curves. This optimal point is the orthogonal projection of ¼ on hY i when assumption
(E) is ful¯lled.
This last property entails the following geometric interpretation, µa la Caplin and Nale-
bu®, of the main argument of the paper (proven in Lemma 2 in Appendix B): trying to
¯nd a best challenger to yk, within the production plans of ¯rm k (the production plans
of other ¯rms remaining ¯xed), reduces to try and cut the support, ¢S, of the agents'
types by an hyperplane containing hY i in such a way as to maximize the di®erence in
volume of the two resulting pieces |a volume computed using the distribution of voting
weights, as the governance speci¯es it.
10DeMarzo (1993) proves that a production plan which is stable with respect to a `unanimity responsive'
collective decision rule should be chosen by using a normalized present value vector in the convex hull of
those of all shareholders. A `unanimity responsive' collective decision rule is such that it should be able
to implement an alternative production plan that Pareto dominates the incumbent. See also Proposition
31.3 in Magill and Quinzii (1996).
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A fundamental preliminary result
It states that any vectorial subspace in h¢Si can be spanned by a multiplan Y that can
be associated with a PE with equal unit prices.
Lemma 1 Under assumption (A), any multiplan Y = (yk)Kk=1 generates a vectorial sub-
space that can be supported by a production multiplan associated to a PE with unit prices:
there exists a production multiplan ~Y = (~yk)Kk=1, with ~y1 = y1, such that hY i ´ h~Y i, and
( ~Y ;1K; ~µ) is a PE. Moreover, y1 can be chosen such that ~µ(¼) > 0 for all ¼.
Proof: See Appendix A. 2
This fundamental Lemma allows to focus only on the span hY i of a multiplan Y , and not
on the multiplan itself. Moreover, the fact that ~µ(¼) can be taken strictly positive for all ¼
secures that all shareholders have the right to vote and that the considered distributions
of voting weights are positive over the whole support ¢S.
3 The canonical case
We consider the canonical case of uniform distributions of initial characteristics in the set
of types ¢S. Assumptions:
² for the p0-governance: the distribution f is uniform and µ0k(¼) > 0 for all k, all ¼;
² for the p1-governance: the distribution f is uniform and Pk µ0k(¼) > 0 for all ¼;
² for the a0-governance: the distribution f ¢ µ0k is uniform for all k;
² for the a1-governance: the distribution f ¢ Pk µ0k is uniform.
It is worth noticing that the results of the present section remain valid under the assump-
tion of separable utility functions of the type (3) (see Claim 2 in Section 4.4) and that
the preceding set of assumptions are weaker for governances µa la Drµeze, i.e., based on
post-trade shares, than for governances µa la Grossman-Hart.
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3.1 Existence of MSPE
For any ¯xed positive integers S and K, K · S, de¯ne11
½S;K = 1 ¡
0@ jS¡1K kj
S¡1
K
k
+ 1
1AbS¡1K c : (4)
Theorem 1 Fix K and S. There always exist, in the canonical case, ½S;K{MSPE12 for
all governances of De¯nition 2. Hence ½¤ · ½S;K for all four governances.
When K = 1, there are no transaction between agents and everybody keeps its initial
share of the ¯rm; since the shares are uniformly distributed accross agents, then the four
governances coincide, and the above result is a particular case of Caplin and Nalebu®
(1988), which gives as a uniform upper bound: 1 ¡ 1=e ¼ 0:632. This upper bound is
approached for the present concept of majority voting equilibrium in the case where the
number of assets (or ¯rms) is negligible with respect to the number of states of the world.
In other cases the rate of super-majority rule that guarantees the existence of a MSPE
is lower than this previous bound. For example, whatever the number of states of nature,
if S=3 · K < S=2 [resp. S=4 · K < S=3] then a rate of 56% [resp. 60%] su±ces. Another
example is the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1 S{MSPE exist as soon as K ¸ S=2 for all four governances.
Thus, even with a high degree of market incompleteness, a production equilibrium
exists against which, within each ¯rm, no alternative production plan can rally more than
half of the shareholders, or shares. The sequel of this section is a proof of Theorem 1
which goes through the design of the `right' securities.
3.2 Basic construction of a MSPE
The aim is to construct a ½{MSPE for the lowest possible ½. For ¯xed S and K, de¯ne
n =
¹S ¡ 1
K
º
, so that S = nK +m, with 1 < m · K. We then construct the following
partition of the set of states of nature into K subsets (according to the natural order, the
m ¯rst subsets contain n+ 1 elements, the K ¡m others contain only n elements):
Sk = f(k ¡ 1)(n+ 1) + 1; : : : ; k(n+ 1)g for 1 · k · m
Tk = fm+ (k ¡ 1)n+ 1; : : : ;m+ kng for m+ 1 · k · K
11For any real x, we denote by bxc the largest integer smaller or equal to x, and by dxe the smallest
integer larger or equal to x.
12In fact there is a continuum of such MSPE (see the proof).
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De¯ne the K production plans ¹Y = (¹yk)Kk=1, such that:
for k · m; ¹ysk =
8<: 1n+1 if s 2 Sk0 otherwise ; for k ¸ m+ 1; ¹ysk =
8<: 1n if s 2 Tk0 otherwise (5)
The main argument revolves around the following proposition which is a more developed
restatement of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 Fix S and K. Thanks to Lemma 1, there exist PE ( ~Y ;1K; ~µ) that are
½S;K{MSPE for the four governances. They are such that h ~Y i ´ h ¹Y i and for all ¼, the
optimal consumption is
~x(¼) =
X
k
~µk(¼) ~yk =
X
k
¹µk(¼) ¹yk
where ¹µ is de¯ned by13:
¹µk(¼) =
8>>><>>>:
¼Sk if k · m
¼Tk if k ¸ m+ 1
: (6)
Proof: See Appendix B. 2
Example: When both f and µ0 are taken uniform (and normalized), and all ¯rms have
the same size (¡0k is independent of K), an example of such a PE ( ~Y ;1K ; ~µ) is:
for k · m; ~yk = (n+ 1)KS ¹yk ¡
1
S
KX
j=m+1
¹yj ; and for k ¸ m+ 1; ~yk = ¹yk ; (7)
and ~µk(¼) =
8>>><>>>:
S
(n+1)K ¼
Sk if k · m
¼Tk + 1(n+1)K ¼
S if k ¸ m+ 1
:
A geometric interpretation of Proposition 1 will be helpful to understand the proof and
the basic intuition of the construction. As written before, given that market equilibrium
prices are 1K , the optimal choice of an agent is the point of tangency between hY i and
the sections by h¢Si of the agent's indi®erence curves. Denote ~§(¼) the section by h¢Si
of the indi®erence curve going through the optimal choice ~x(¼) (cf. Figure 1.a below).
A change in the production plan ~yk (or equivalently ¹yk) of ¯rm k will then move h¹Y i in
13Denote, for a subset V of the set of states of nature, ¼V =
X
s2V
¼s.
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such a way that it still goes through all other ~yj 's. This change, ¯xing the shares at their
post-trade values, projects the equilibrium consumption ~x(¼) inward or outward ~§(¼),
hence resulting in an improving or impairing change of the utility level of agent ¼ (cf.
Figure 1.b below).
Lemma 2 in Appendix B shows that ¯nding a best challenger to ~yk, within the pro-
duction plans of ¯rm k (the production plans of other ¯rms remaining ¯xed), amounts
to ¯nding the in¯nitesimal move of ~yk which improves the welfare of the biggest propor-
tion of shareholders or shares. Given assumption (E), this reduces to try and cut ¢S by
a hyperplane (orthogonal to this in¯nitesimal change) containing hY i in such a way as
to maximize the di®erence in volume of the two resulting pieces. The best in¯nitesimal
change (of ~yk) is pointing toward the largest piece. As in Caplin and Nalebu® (1988) it
is shown that, when the distribution of initial characteristics is uniform, the most chal-
lenging in¯nitesimal change of the production plan ~yk is to sacri¯ce one state of nature
to the bene¯t of all others14, and implement a change
³¡²; ²S¡1 ; : : : ; ²S¡1´.
3.3 Geometric illustration: S = 3 and K = 2
In the case S = 3 and K = 2, and under the assumptions given in the example following Proposition 1,
with ¹y1 = (1=2; 1=2; 0) and ¹y2 = (0; 0; 1), and therefore ~y2 = ¹y2 and ~y1 = (2=3; 2=3;¡1=3), one gets:
[~µ1(¼); ~µ2(¼)] =
µ
3
4
[¼1 + ¼2]; ¼3 +
1
4
[¼1 + ¼2]
¶
and [¹µ1(¼); ¹µ2(¼)] =
¡
[¼1 + ¼2]; ¼3
¢
:
This is drawn on Figure 1.a; the indi®erence curve ~§(¼) corresponding to the optimal utility level for
agent ¼ is drawn: it is a circle around the ideal security ¼. An illustration of the previous discussion is
now provided in this simple case and basically holds for the four governances.
Optimal cutting of the simplex: It should be clear on the drawing why ( ~Y ;12; ~µ) is majority stable
for the simple-majority rule under all four governances. Indeed, consider, instead of ~y2, another proposal
~y02 (see Figure 1.b). The shares being ¯xed, the new consumption of agent ¼ will become ~x(¼)0 which
dives inward ~§, hence resulting in a higher utility. But for the symmetric (with respect to h¹Y i) agent,
characterized by type ¼¿ = (¼2; ¼1; ¼3), who at equilibrium consumes the same ~x(¼¿ ) = ~x(¼), this is an
impairing change. Hence at least half of the agents (the left part of the triangle) ¯nds it impairing that any
rightward change of the production plan of ~y2 be implemented. Symmetrically, any, even in¯nitesimal,
leftward change of ~y2 is going to be blocked by the agents on the right-hand side of h¹Y i. Finally, since
both agents ¼ and ¼¿ have the same share of ¯rm 2, it is obviously the case that the simple-majority
stability property holds for the four types of governance. The same type of argument holds to prove
14This is actually very classical in Social Choice theory and illustrated by the problem of having to
divide a pie among S individuals; whatever the initial allocation, there is a majority of S¡1S to expropriate
one individual of his share and distribute it evenly to the others.
14
Figure 1.a Figure 1.b
(1; 0; 0) (0; 1; 0)
~y2 = ¹y2 = (0; 0; 1)
¹y1
²
²
~y1²
²² ¼~x(¼)
~§
²
²²
²
²
~y2
~y02
~x
~x0
¼²¼¿
~y1 ²
©©*
¾
that any change in the production plan ~y1 is going to be blocked by at least half of the shareholders, in
number and volume of shares.
Moreover it is clear that there are many ways to cut ¢3 into two pieces of equal sizes. The two pieces
do not have to be symmetric. Actually, Lemma 1 shows that any cutting of ¢3 can be spanned by two
production plans (y1; y2) which will generate a PE with unit prices, hence securing that the fundamental
geometrical interpretation of Theorem 1 be valid. This ensures a continuum of s-MSPE is the present
simple case.
Figure 1.c Figure 1.d
y^1
²
²
²
²² ¼~x
y^01
y^2
~x0
a b
²
²
²¼¿
¹§
¹y2
²
²
²
²
¹x(¼)
¼
¹y1 ±¹y1
±¹x(¼)
~y1 ²
¡
¡µ
¡µ
?
?
Multiplicity of the MSPE: There are a contimuun of PE that end up with the same \cutting" of ¢S
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with unit prices q = 12 for both assets, and unchanged ¹µ (see Lemma 1): for all ®, y1 = (13+®;
1
3+®;
1
3¡2®)
and y2 = (13 ¡ ®; 13 ¡ ®; 13 + 2®) will always found a PE with q = 12 and equilibrium shares ¹µ. (Notice
~® = 13 .) For example, with ®^ =
1
6 , one gets y^1 = ¹y1 = (1=2; 1=2; 0) and y^2 = (1=6; 1=6; 2=3), with:
[µ^1(¼); µ^2(¼)] =
¡
[¼1 + ¼2] ¡ 12¼3; 32¼3
¢
so that x^(¼) = ~x(¼) = ¹x(¼) (see Figure 1.c). The drawn change
from y^1 to y^01 will be utility improving for agent ¼, but utility impairing for agent ¼¿ . Notice here that
all agents characterized by a type ¼ such that ¼3 ¸ 2=3 (i.e., above the dotted line [a; b]), do not have the
right to vote under governances based on post-trade shares since their post-trade shares in y^1 are negative.
Hence the same rule as before is ful¯lled: any rightward (resp. leftward) change in the production plan
y^1 will be blocked by (at least) the left-hand (resp. right-hand) side of the triangle, whose top has been
cut-o®. It is to avoid the minor and irrelevant technical di±culty of having to compute relative volumes
in a cut-o® simplex that PE are contructed for which all shares allocated at equilibrium are positive (i.e.,
with ® > 1=3).
Assets with di®erent prices, the Pareto criterion: One can easily see that any proposed change
of ~y1 along the line h¹Y i will be unanimously rejected. This fact is linked to the reason why there is no
majority stable production equilibrium with announced production plans (¹y1; ¹y2): in fact the PE based
on this multiplan does not satisfy the Pareto criterion (see Observation 1). Indeed, the equilibrium price
vector is then such that q1 > q2: the shareholders will ¯nd it optimal to `load' more than in the above
case their portfolio with shares of ¹y2 (see Figure 1.d) to reach the optimal consumption ¹x(¼). As drawn
on Figure 1.d, the optimal utility level will then generate an indi®erence surface ¹§ not tangent to h¹Y i.
Given the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, any change ±¹y1 of ¹y1 toward ~y1 will be unanimously
supported, since the consecutive change ±¹x(¼) is always utility improving. This is true untill ¹y1 reaches
~y1.
4 More general cases
In this section, more general density functions, f , and initial distributions of shares,
µ0, are investigated. To avoid minor technical di±culties that would make the reading
less confortable without making the problem richer, we consider only strictly positive
initial distributions of characteristics: µ0(¼) > 0 and f(¼) > 0 for all ¼. The aim is to
generalize as much as possible the results of the previous section. In a ¯rst subsection, we
investigate, for unspeci¯ed f and µ0, the case of complete markets, along with the case
of incomplete markets with only one dimension of incompleteness. Then we consider the
case of symmetric distributions of characteristics (subsection 4.2). For these two cases,
simple majority production equilibria are shown to exist. Finally, the case of º-concave
distributions of characteristics is considered (subsection 4.3), an assumption regarded as
imposing some measure of consensus in the society of shareholders. Caplin and Nalebu®
(1991) results are then used to provide ratios of ½-majority stable production equilibria.
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4.1 The cases K = S, K = S ¡ 1
The case K = S is trivial, since for a PE (Y;1K; µ) |whose existence is secured by
Lemma 1| every agent of type ¼ is able to generate its idiosyncratic ideal security:
[
P
k µ0k(¼)] ¢ ¼. In this case, in equilibrium, all yk's are unanimously supported against
any alternative production plan for any f and any initial distribution of shares µ0; i.e.,
PY;µ0(yk) = AY;µ0(yk) = PY;µ(yk) = AY;µ(yk) = 0 for all k, as the theory of complete
markets predicts. We thus have the following observation.
Observation 2 If K = S, for any density f and any initial distributions of shares µ0,
there exist PE which are stable for any voting rule (even infra-majority voting rule15).
The case K = S ¡ 1 is more di±cult and interesting. As far as the p0 and p1-
governances are concerned, the argument is straighforward since the same distribution of
voting weights, f , is taken for all ¯rms. Therefore a median-voter-like argument allows to
go through: For a PE (Y;1K ; µ), we know that ¯nding a best challenger to the announced
production plan yk amounts to cut the support of agents' types by a hyperplane containing
hY i. But there is a unique such hyperplane, i.e., hY i itself. Therefore, to prove existence of
a s{MSPE, it is enough to choose hY i such that it separates ¢S into two pieces of equal
measure with respect to f . This is obviously always possible, and there is an in¯nite
number of ways to do so as soon as S > 2. Thanks to Lemma 1, we know that such a
hyperplane can be supported by a PE with unit prices and positive shares.
The argument is more complicated for governances based on shares, e.g., the a0 and
a1-governances. Indeed, hY i should be chosen such that it separates ¢S into two pieces of
equal measure simultaneously with respect to K(= S¡ 1) distributions of voting weights.
Hence a `multivariate-median-voter' argument is necessary. The following proposition,
based on degree theory and using the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, is shown. 16
Theorem 2 If K = S ¡ 1, there exist s-MSPE for any f and any µ0, for all four gover-
nances.
Proof: To prove existence of s{MSPEa0 one has to choose hY i that separates ¢S into two
pieces of equal measure with respect to the distributions f ¢ µ0k, for all k.
15An infra-majority voting rule is a majority rule with rate ½ < 1=2, i.e. such that an alternative a
defeats an alternative b if a proportion bigger than ½ of the population prefers a to b; hence it is possible
that two alternatives defeat each other at the same time.
16It is worth noticing that it remains valid under assumption (A) only (cf. Claim 1 in Section 4.4) on
the utility functions for the governance based on pre-trade shares.
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Consider the (S ¡ 2){unit sphere (of dimension S ¡ 2) SS¡2. For any point Á on the
sphere, denote hÁi the hyperplane (of dimension S ¡ 2) in h¢Si that is orthogonal to the
vector
¡!
0Á and divides ¢S into two pieces of equal measure with respect to the distribution
f ¢ Pk µ0k. Denote hÁi+ the one of these two pieces toward which ¡!0Á points. For any k,
1 · k · K ¡ 1 (= S ¡ 2), denote ¹0k(Á) the (continuous) measure of hÁi+ with respect to
the distribution f ¢ µ0k. A generalization of the Borsuk-Ulam theorem17 states that there
exists a point Á0 such that for all k, 1 · k · K ¡ 1, one has:
¹0k(Á0) = ¹
0
k(¡Á0) :
Therefore, given that hÁ0i = h¡Á0i, hÁ0i divides ¢S into two pieces of equal measure
with respect to the distributions f ¢ µ0k, for all k, 1 · k · K ¡ 1. Since by construction it
also divides ¢S into two pieces of equal measure with respect to f ¢ Pk µ0k, it does so with
respect to f ¢ µ0K . Hence the proof for the a0-governance.
To prove existence of s{MSPEa1 one has to choose a hyperplane that separates ¢S
into two pieces of equal measure with respect to the distributions f ¢ µk, for all k. The
argument is more complicated because the latter distributions are endogeneously de¯ned.
Nevertheless, the argument also relies on the Borsuk-Ulam theorem applied to functions
de¯ned through another principle. This is postponed to Appendix B. 2
4.2 Symmetric densities
It is possible to de¯ne more general assumptions under which simple majority stable
production equilibria exist for all four governances |i.e., Corollary 1 holds true. We
de¯ne symmetric distributions of types: for all permutations ¾ of f1; : : : ; Sg, if ¼¾ denotes
the vector of probabilities: (¼¾(1); : : : ; ¼¾(S)), then for all ¼, f(¼¾) = f(¼).
Proposition 2 Assume that f [resp. f ¢ µ0k for all k, f ¢ Pk µ0k] is symmetric over ¢S,
then s{MSPEp0 and p1 [resp. s{MSPEa0, s{MSPEa1] exist as soon as K ¸ S=2.
Proof: Thanks to Lemma 2, this goes by proving that any hyperplane through ¹Y (as
de¯ned by equations (5)) cuts ¢S into two equal parts, in terms of shareholders (¯rst
17See Theorem 3.2.7 in Lloyd (1978): Let D be a bounded, open, symmetric subset of Rn containing 0;
let ¹ : @D ¡! Rm be continuous, and m < n; then there is Á 2 @D such that ¹(Á) = ¹(¡Á). Here D is
the unit ball, n = S¡1, @D ´ SS¡2, and m = S¡2: ¹(Á) = (¹01(Á); : : : ; ¹0K¡1(Á)). An illustration is that
there exist two antipodal points on the earth with same temperature and pressure. See also Guillemin
and Pollack (1974), pages 91-93.
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assertion of the proposition) as well as in terms of shares (second assertion). Since K ¸
S=2, one has S = K +m with m · K. To any ¼, associate its symmetric through h¹Y i:
¼¿ = (¼2; ¼1; : : : ; ¼2m; ¼2m¡1; ¼2m+1; : : : ; ¼S) :
Generically, ¼ and ¼¿ are strictly on each side of h¹Y i, and then will always counter-balance
each other in any collective decision making under `one person-one vote' governances.
Under the assumptions of the proposition they have the same amount of shares of each
¯rm, and will always counter-balance each other in any collective decision making under
`one share-one vote' governances. 2
In fact, as easily seen from the proof, much lighter assumptions of symmetry can ensure
the result. Indeed, the argument developed here shows some similarity with the underlying
analysis in Grandmont (1978): in that paper, existence of majority-stable equilibria (in
the case without exchange: K = 1) was shown for centrally-symmetric supports of agents'
types. The present argument relies on the same principle: the simplex ¢S is symmetric,
not with respect to a point, but with respect to K-dimensional subspaces (withK ¸ S=2),
and the only needed assumption is that the distributions of characteristics be symmetric
with respect to one of these subspaces18.
4.3 º-concave densities
A density function f is º-concave over ¢S if for all ¼; ¼0 2 ¢S, 8¸ 2 [0; 1],
f [(1 ¡ ¸)¼ + ¸¼0] ¸ [(1 ¡ ¸)f(¼)º + ¸f(¼0)º]1=º :
This assumption is regarded as imposing some measure of consensus in the society. Notice
that for º = 1, one gets the uniform distribution of Section 3. De¯ne19 :
½(S; º) = 1 ¡
Ã
S ¡ 1 + 1=º
S + 1=º
!S+1=º
:
Consider a PE (Y;1K ; µ). As in the canonical case, ¯nding a best challenger to the
equilibrium production plan of a ¯rm reduces to try and cut the support ¢S by an
18There is the implicit feature, in Caplin and Nalebu® (1988), that the simplex is, as a support of
voters' type, the geometrical shape that allows the most uneven cutting through the center of gravity
(see the principle of symmetrization of Schwartz on which they found this feature): if an upper bound
works for the simplex, it works for any other convex support. This feature might not be true anymore as
far as cutting the support through a well-chosen K-dimensional subspace is concerned.
19The ratio ½(S; º) is bounded above by 1 ¡ 1=e when º ¸ 0.
19
hyperplane containing hY i in such a way as to maximize the di®erence in volume of the two
resulting pieces. When the distribution of shareholders' voting weights is exogeneously
¯xed (as for the p0, p1 and a0 governances), given that the support of all considered
distributions is convex, one can directly import Caplin and Nalebu® (1991) main result
on º-concave distribution of characteristics to get the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If f is º-concave, then for º ¸ ¡1=S, any PE (Y;1K ; µ) such that hY i
contains the mean shareholder's type20 ¼g of distribution f is a ½(S; º){MSPEp0 and p1.
If f ¢ µk0 is º-concave for all k, then for º ¸ ¡1=S, any PE (Y;1K ; µ) such that hY i
contains the K mean shareholder types (¼kg )Kk=1 of the K distributions (f ¢ µk0)Kk=1 is a
½(S; º){MSPEa0.
In both cases, there exist a continuum of such ½(S; º){MSPE.
It is clear that, for the for the `one person-one vote' governances, the higher K, the
smaller the rate of super-majority ½ that is necessary to guarantee the existence of ½{
majority stable production equilibria. Indeed, on top of having to cut ¢S through its
center of gravity, one can add as many constraints as there are ¯rms, each added constraint
lowering the di®erence in size of the two pieces resulting from the cutting. We leave for
further research actual computations of the extent to which the subsequent rate ½ can be
improved, i.e., by computing the true21 min-max ½(S;K; º). For the a0-governance, one
does not have these K ¡ 1 added constraints on the way to cut the simplex. It is easy to
prove in that setup that the ratio ½(S; º) cannot be improved for the a0-governance.
When the distribution of shareholders' voting weights is endogeneously determined
by the market mechanism from the announced multiplan Y , as for the a1-governance, a
result similar to Proposition 3 is more di±cult to obtain. One has to prove the existence
of a PE (Y;1K ; µ) such that, for all k,
1. hY i contains, for all k, the center of gravity of the `equilibrium' distribution f ¢ µk;
2. f ¢ µk º-concave for some º.
The following multivariate mean shareholder theorem can be proposed.
Theorem 3 If the distribution f ¢Pk µ0k is º-concave, then for ¡1=S · º · 1, there exist
½(S; º){MSPEa1.
20The mean shareholder's type is the one that lies at the center of gravity of the distribution; it is
de¯ned as: ¼g = (¼1g ; : : : ; ¼Sg ) with for all s: ¼sg =
Z
¢S
f(¼) ¼s d¼.
21For º = 1, ½(S;K;1) = ½S;K as de¯ned by (4).
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Proof: See Appendix B. In fact the proof shows that there are, generically with respect
to f ¢ Pk µ0k, up to
0@ S ¡ 1
K ¡ 1
1A di®erent subspaces hY i for which the theorem holds. 2
This last result sheds some light on the debate on which objective function the ¯rm
should optimize in the context of incomplete markets. Firm should make choices that are
supported by shareholders. In the present setup, a shareholder is basically characterized
by its type ¼, which can be identi¯ed as his ideal security. For example Theorem 3 shows
existence of production equilibria which are stable for `acceptable' rates of super majority;
they are such that, for ¯rm k, the shareholder whose type, ¼g;k, is at the center of gravity
of the equilibrium distribution of shares (i.e., the above-mentioned mean shareholder)
can exactly span its type, and generate its ideal security: [
P
` µ0` (¼g;k)] ¢ ¼g;k; he could not
do better if markets were complete. But to span his ideal security he needs, in general,
to buy all securities. (The same line of reasoning holds for the a0-governance through
Proposition 3.)
This result has no direct link with the Drµeze criterion. Indeed, the announced se-
curity/production plan, yk, of ¯rm k does not have to be the ideal security/production
plan, ¼g;k, of this mean shareholder (in general, the multiplan Y , with yk = ¼0g;k cannot
be supported as a Pareto PE). But the multiplan Y should be such that it contains the
ideal security of all mean shareholders; in some way the multiplan Y is optimal for the
K mean shareholders. Then the production equilibria are stable for the lowest possible
rates of super majority. Finally, it is also the case here that the assumptions securing the
result are weaker for the governances µa la Drµeze, i.e., based on post-trade shares.
4.4 Extensions
Immediate extension to a broader class of utility functions
As easily seen from the proof, the existence of s-MSPE (for governances based on pre-trade
shares) in the case K = S ¡ 1 (or, trivially, K = S) are still valid under assumption (A)
and the assumption that ¼ = Argmax fU¼(x) j x 2 ¢Sg. Indeed, given a PE (Y;1K ; µ),
the ¯rst order conditions of agents' maximization programs give, for all k ¸ 2, all ¼:
DU¼[x(¼)] ¢ (yk ¡ y1) = 0 : (8)
Suppose K = S¡ 1, when asked whether they agree with an in¯nitesimal change u 2 RS
(which can be taken orthogonal to h¹Y i, given equations (8)) in the production plan of
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¯rm k, a shareholder ¼ is indi®erent if and only if ¼ 2 h ¹Y i. And the proof of Theorem 2
goes through.
The assumption that ¼ = Argmax fU¼(x) j x 2 ¢Sg can in fact be released. Given
a utility function U¼, one can construct the mapping from ¢S into itself which, to each
type ¼, associates its most prefered production plan y¤(¼) = Argmax fU¼(x) j x 2 ¢Sg.
The proof of Theorem 2 remains valid under replacement of f by f ± y¤. Therefore the
following claim.
Claim 1 Theorem 2 remains valid under assumption (A).
In addition, we can, for symmetric distributions of characteristics (and in particular
for the canonical case), extend the result of the paper to the broader class of separable
utility functions of the form (3).
Claim 2 Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 remain valid under assumption (A) if in addition
the utility functions are taken to be of the separable form (3) and, for Theorem 1, under
replacement of f by22 f ± y¤.
Proof: For Proposition 2, given the symmetry of the distribution of characteristics and
identity of the utility functions, ¼ and ¼¿ will always counter-balance each other in any
collective decision making under both governances when departing from the PE (~Y ;1K ; ~µ)
such that h~Y i ´ h¹Y i, where ¹Y is de¯ned through equations (5). For Theorem 1, see
Appendix C. 2
4.5 Concluding Comments
In fact, it should be possible to extend the analysis to the broader set of assumptions dealt
with in Caplin and Nalebu® (1991): production plans are to be taken in an n-dimensional
Euclidian space Y , preferences vary accross society and are characterized by a vector
¼ 2 C ½ RS¡1, an (S¡1)-dimensional index of types. The preferences of an agent of type
¼ over the set of allocations x 2 Y (x is a linear combination of the proposed production
multiplan) are represented by a continuously di®erentiable utility function U(¼; x). The
distribution of types accross society is represented by a probability measure with density
22For instance, consider utility functions of the separable form (3) with vs(x) = x¹ with 0 < ¹ < 1.
U¼ satisfy assumption (A) and for all ¼, y¤(¼) = [(¼s)1=1¡¹=
P
s(¼
s)1=1¡¹]Ss=1 (notice that ¹ ¡! 0
allows to get the log-linear case). Take then, for the distribution of types over ¢S, the density f(¼) =
[
P
s(¼
s)1=1¡¹]1¡¹
P
s(¼
s)1¡¹, in which case f ± y¤ is uniform.
22
f de¯ned over the set of types C. Preferences should satisfy assumptions (A) and (E),
or any other which would secure that the types indi®erent to any in¯nitesimal change
in the production plan ly on a hyperplane in the space of utility parameters. Moreover
the support C of the agents' types should be convex and the distribution f should be
º-concave over C.
Even though it is probably within reach to extend the results of Section 4 to this more
general setup, and prove that Caplin and Nalebu®'s bound ½(S; º) holds for production
equilibria, it is certainly much more di±cult to compute (as in the canonical case) by how
much ½(S;K; º) can be improved depending on the number of ¯rms K. It is probably
also di±cult to extend the results of Section 4.3 to the case of separable utility functions
of the form (3).
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Appendix A : Comments
A family of increasingly homogeneous distributions
In this section we reproduce the preceding analysis for a family23 of distributions of agents/shares on
¢S which exhibit an increasing degree of homogeneity. Homogeneity means that agents' beliefs are more
concentrated around a particular value of ¼ which is taken here to be the equiprobable belief at the center
of ¢S. For increasing integers c, de¯ne
dc(¼) = (cS ¡ 1)!
SY
s=1
(¼s)c¡1
(c ¡ 1)! :
Figure 2 illustrate the shape of these densities on ¢2.
Figure 2
(1; 0) (0; 1)
² ²
c = 1
c = 2
c = 10
These density functions are clearly log-concave, and therefore they fall into Caplin and Nalebu®
(1991) class of conditions guaranteeing an upper bound of 1¡1=e for the super-majority rules neccessary
to ensure stability of the PE.
The same assumptions on the distributions of characteristics are made than in the canonical case,
except that the uniform distribution is replced by the distribution de¯ned by the density dc. This section
shows that the needed rates of super majority are smaller ththe bigger c, an intuitive result indeed, but
to which exact measure are given. De¯ne, for all S, K and c:
½cS;K = 1 ¡
µ
n
n + 1
¶cn c¡1X
j=0
Ã
nc ¡ 1 + j
j
!µ
1
n + 1
¶j
;
with n =
¥S¡1
K
¦
.
23Crµes and Tvede (1998) gives an urn-based model of how these distributions are generated and provides
an interpretation in terms of beliefs' formation in the society.
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Proposition 4 Fix S, K and c. Then there exist ½cS;K{MSPE for all four governances.
For instance, for c = 2 and n = 2 (resp. n = 3, n = 4), a 54%-majority rule (resp. , a 55.6, a
56.4%-majority rule) is enough to ensure existence of a MSPE. Moreover Corollary 1 remains valid.
Corollary 2 For any ¯nite c, and K ¸ S=2, s-MSPE exist for all four governances.
Corollary 3 Fix c. Then for all S, K, there exist ½c{MSPE for all four governances with:
½c = 1 ¡
Ã
c¡1X
i=0
ci
i!
!
e¡c :
These rates are smaller than ½1 = 1 ¡ 1=e ¼ 0:632:
½2 ¼ 0:594 ½4 ¼ 0:566 ½20 ¼ 0:530
½3 ¼ 0:577 ½10 ¼ 0:542 ½50 ¼ 0:519
and moreover ½c coverges toward 1=2 when c tends toward in¯nity. E.g., whatever the degree of market
incompleteness, and even when K = 1, a 60%-majority rule (resp. 52%-majority rule) is enough to ensure
existence of a MSPE for both governances, when c = 2 (resp. c = 50). All proofs are given in Appendix
C.
Robustness to pessimism
We now consider, for t 2 R, the utility functions:
U¼;t(x) =
"
SX
s=1
¼s
µ
xs
¼s
¶t#1=t
: (9)
They all admit ¼ as their most prefered alternative in ¢S (¼ = Argmax fU¼;t(x) ; x 2 ¢Sg). For
t ¡! 0, they de¯ne, up to a constant, the log-linear utility functions of the type (3) with for all s, vs ´ ln
(log-linear utility functions of this type de¯ne in ¢S, for a ¯xed ¼, a family of concave indi®erence
curves, `centered' on ¼ |indeed, ¼ = Argmax fPSs=1 ¼s log xs ; x 2 ¢Sg| and `converging' toward
the boundary of ¢S for utility levels tending toward ¡1 (see Figure 3.a)). For negative decreasing
values of t, they represent the preferences of an agent always having the prior ¼ on the realization of the
states of nature, but who becomes more and more `pessimistic', hence de¯ning a family of indi®erence
surfaces `centered' on ¼ but which are more and more triangular (in the case S = 3, see Figure 3.b). And
for t = ¡1, U¼;t becomes:
U¼;¡1(x) = min
s
½
xs
¼s
¾
; (10)
whose indi®erence surfaces in ¢S are simplices of dimension S ¡ 1 (represented in the case S = 3 on
Figure 3.c). This last case holds for agents which are completely pessimistic: they only care for lowest
consumption in period 1 (relative to the probability of realization of the state of nature).
Assume that agents are characterized by the utility functions U¼;¡1. Assume moreover that they are
symmetrically distributed over ¢S and allocated symmetric initial shares of the ¯rms. Suppose ¯nally
that for all k, the total quantity of shares distributed is constant accross ¯rms: ¡0k = ¡
0 is independent
of k. Then we have the following proposition.
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Figure 3.a Figure 3.b Figure 3.c
² ² ²
Proposition 5 The min-max majority, for all governances, is
¿S;K =
¥S¡1
K
¦¥S¡1
K
¦
+ 1
:
Proof: See Appendix C. 2
We can draw two remarks from this last result.
1. This entails that in Caplin and Nalebu® (1988, 1991) case where K = 1, the min-max majority is
¿S;1 = S¡1S . Hence for a big number of states of the world, only rates close to unaninity secure
that the center of gravity of the support of agents' types is majority stable. Greenberg (1979)
proves that for decision problems in RS¡1 with K = 1 and individual with convex preferences, the
min-max is bounded above by S¡1S . For those pessimistic preferences, Greenberg (1979)'s bound
of S¡1S is then reached.
2. The bene¯t, in terms of majority stability, of having access to many assets in this case is much
bigger than in the case of separable preferences: if n
¡
=
¥S¡1
K
¦¢
is not too big, ¿S;K keeps tractable
values (e.g., 67% if n = 3), whereas it is close to unaninity when K is small. In particular, for any
¯nite S;K, it is still the case that s{MSPE exist as soon as K ¸ S=2 for all governances.
Appendix B : Proofs of Sections 2, 3 and 4
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a production multiplan Y = (yk)Kk=1, generating a (K ¡ 1)-dimensional
subspace hY i. De¯ne, for agent ¼, the normalized optimal portfolio ¹µ(¼) which solves the following
program:
max
¹µ(¼)
~U¼;Y [¹µ(¼)]
s. t.
KX
k=1
¹µk(¼) = 1
The resulting normalized optimal consumption ¹x(¼) =
PK
k=1
¹µk(¼) yk is then the point where the
indi®erence surface of agent ¼ in ¢S is tangent to hY i. One then has (dropping ¼): ¡!y1¹x =
KX
k=2
¹µk
¡!y1yk.
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De¯ne the multiplan ~Y = (~yk)Kk=1 such that ~y1 = y1 and,
for k ¸ 2; ¡!y1~yk= ®k ¡!y1yk with ®k =
Z
¢S
f(¼)
"X
k
µ0k(¼)
#
¹µk(¼) d¼Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼
: (11)
De¯ne moreover, for k ¸ 2,
~µk(¼) =
"X
k
µ0k(¼)
# Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼Z
¢S
f(¼)
"X
k
µ0k(¼)
#
¹µk(¼) d¼
¹µk(¼) and ~µ1(¼) =
X
k
µ0k(¼) ¡
X
k¸2
~µk(¼) :
One then obtains, for all k: Z
¢S
f(¼) ~µk(¼) d¼ =
Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼ ;
and moreover ~µ(¼) =
h
~µk(¼)
iK
k=1
obviously solves the program:
max
µ(¼)
~U¼;~Y [µ(¼)]
s. t.
KX
k=1
µk(¼) =
KX
k=1
µ0k(¼)
Therefore (~Y ;1K ; [~µ(¼)]¼2¢S ) is a PE. 2
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof goes through three steps. The ¯rst step computes the optimal
consumption ~x(¼), and, for the sake of illustration, proves that ( ~Y ;1K ; ~µ) as de¯ned by (7) is a PE under
the assumptions of the example following Proposition 1. The second and third steps prove that any PE
(~Y ;1K ; ~µ) such that h~Y i ´ h¹Y i is a ½S;K{MSPE for all governances: the second step is the construction
of the best way to challenge a PE within each ¯rm; the third step is the computation of the corresponding
ratios ½S;K .
Step 1: Suppose the K ¯rms announce the production multi-plan ~Y = (~yk)Kk=1. Consider the market
prices to be 1K . Then the maximization program of a agent ¼, M(¼), is equivalent to ¯nding the
portfolio ~µ(¼) which maximizes the utility function: ~U¼;~Y [~µ(¼)] subject to the constraint
P
k
~µ(¼) = 1.
Given assumption (E), and the identity ~x(¼) =
P
k
~µk(¼) ~yk = ¹x(¼) =
P
k
¹µk(¼) ¹yk, it is de¯ned by the
orthogonal projection, ¹x(¼) =
P
k
¹µ(¼)¹yk, of ¼ on h¹Y i. Hence [¹x(¼) ¡ ¼] ¢ [¹y1 ¡ ¹yk] = 0 for all k ¸ 2.
We have24: ¹xs = ¹µk=(n + 1) if s 2 Sk and ¹xs = ¹µk=n if s 2 Tk. Therefore, for all k ¸ 2:
X
s
(¹xs ¡ ¼s)(¹ys1 ¡ ¹ysk) = 0 ()
8<: ¹µk = ¼Sk + (¹µ1 ¡ ¼S1) if k · m¹µk = ¼Tk + nn + 1(¹µ1 ¡ ¼S1) if k ¸ m + 1 :
These equations, along with the condition
P
k
¹µk = 1, straightforwardly imply: ¹µk = ¼Sk when k · m
and ¹µk = ¼Tk when k ¸ m + 1.
24In heavy computations, when no confusion can be feared, ¹x and ¹µ will stand for ¹x(¼) and ¹µ(¼).
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We then have to check that 1K is an equilibrium price. We should have
Z
¢S
f(¼) ~µk(¼) d¼ = ¡0k =
1
K
, for all k. For k · m, a standard application of Fubini's theorem25 gives:
(S ¡ 1)!
Z
¢S
¼Sk d¼ = (S ¡ 1)!
Z 1
0
¼
¼n
n!
(1 ¡ ¼)S¡n¡2
(S ¡ n ¡ 2)! d¼ =
n + 1
S
;
hence the above equilibrium equation is ful¯lled. Through an identical line of computation, the reader
can check that the equilibrium equations for k ¸ m + 1 is ful¯lled.
Step 2: Up to now, we have proved that ~E = (~Y ;1K ; ~µ) is a PE. We have to prove that it is ½-majority
stable for the lowest possible ½. The ¯rst needed lemma here is a replication of Caplin and Nalebu®
(1988) Proposition 2.
Lemma 2 For all k, P ~E;~´(~yk) (resp. A~E;~´(~yk)) is the largest fraction of shareholders with positive share
(resp. the largest fraction of positive shares) on either side of any hyperplane through ~Y .
Proof: Fix zk, then from the strict concavity of the agents' preferences, zk(¸) = ¸~yk + (1 ¡ ¸)zk will
get a larger fraction than zk of shareholders and shares against ~yk. Indeed, since x + µ[zk(¸) ¡ ~yk] =
¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)[x + µ(zk ¡ ~yk)] then for ¸ 6= 0; 1, U [x + µ(zk(¸) ¡ yk)] > ¸U [x] + (1 ¡ ¸)U [x + µ(zk ¡ ~yk)];
hence U [x + µ(zk ¡ ~yk)] ¸ U [x] entails U [x + µ(zk(¸) ¡ ~yk)] ¸ U [x].
Therefore, in looking for P ~E;~´(~yk) or A~E;~´(~yk) we can focus on alternative production plan zk arbi-
trarily close to ~yk. We know that at a PE, the optimal portfolio is such that the indi®erence surface
of each agent is tangent to h~Y i at the equilibrium consumption. Therefore in the limit, shareholders
whose welfare is improved by the in¯nitesimal move from ~yk are separated from those whose welfare is
impaired by a hyperplane (thanks to assumption (E)) containing h~Y i with normal, given equations (8),
the orthogonal projection of zk ¡ ~yk on the orthogonal of h~Y i. Hence zk can be restricted to converge
toward ~yk orthogonally to h~Y i and in the limit, shareholders are separated by an hyperplane containing
h~Y i with normal zk ¡ ~yk.
The general equation of an hyperplane containing h~Y i is (the intersection with ¢S of):
KX
k=1
X
s2Sk(Tk)
®s ¼s = 1 ; with
8><>>:
8k · m; X
s2Sk
®s = n + 1
8k ¸ m + 1; X
s2Tk
®s = n
; (12)
that one denotes h®i, where ® = (®s)Ss=1. One can easily check that the normal vector, in ¢S, of h®i is
® ¡ 1S. 2
A second lemma is needed.
Lemma 3 For all k, among all hyperplanes through ~Y , the ones that divide ¢S into two pieces with
most unequal volumes (whatever the governance) are those de¯ned by equation (12) with for for some
k · m, ®s = n + 1
n
for s 2 Sk, and for all s 2 (SnSk) [ T , ®s = 1.
25The volume computed throughout the paper are those of the projection of ¢S on the last variable,
i.e., of the set of vector ¸ 2 RS¡1+ such that
S¡1X
s=1
¸s · 1.
29
Proof: Let us prove the lemma in the most di±cult case, i.e., for the a1-governance, the other cases are a
straightforward simpli¯cation of the following proof. De¯ne the projection from the (S ¡ 1){dimensional
simplex onto the (K ¡ 1){dimensional simplex:
P : ¢S ¡! ¢K
(¼s; : : : ; ¼S) ¡! (¼S1 ; : : : ; ¼Sm ; ¼Tm+1 ; : : : ; ¼TK )
Fix a vector of shares (¹µk)Kk=1 (and thus (~µk)
K
k=1) in ¢K . The set of agents having exactly those
shares are in P¡1[(¹µk)]. We are now reduced to the problem of dividing P¡1[(¹µk)] as unevenly as possible
by an hyperplane going through its center point. But P¡1[(¹µk)] is a cartesian product of simplices of
dimension either n (for k · m) or n ¡ 1 (for k ¸ m + 1), with equation: Ps2Sk(Tk) ¼s = ¹µk. This
very structure will make the former task simple: it is su±cient to divide one of the base-simplex (e.g.,
k) as unevenly as possible (measure-wise) and consider the cartesian product of the big portion with all
other simplices. From Caplin and Nalebu® (1988) we know that a base-simplex have to be divided by
an hyperplane parallel to one face: among all hyperplanes of the form
P
s2Sk(Tk) ®
s ¼s = 1 we have to
choose one such that ®sk =
n+1
n for all but one s in Sk (or =
n
n¡1 for all but one s in Tk); the portion
between this hyperplane and the chosen face is the biggest possible.
It can ¯nally be easily checked that this amounts to propose an in¯nitesimal change of the production
plan ~yk which sacri¯ces one state of nature to the bene¯t of all others and implement for example the
change:
³
¡²; ²S¡1 ; : : : ; ²S¡1
´
. The same cutting occurs if the in¯nitesimal change of the payo®s of the
states in S1 only:
¡¡²; ²n ; : : : ; ²n ; 0; : : : ; 0¢ (orthogonal to h¹Y i) is proposed. 2
Step 3: Let us then compute the proportion of shareholders on the smallest side of the hyperplane de¯ned
by equation (12) with, according to Lemma 3 (let us do it for ¯rm 1 without loss of generality): ®1 = 0,
®s = n+1n for s 2 S1n1 and ®s = 1 for s 2 (SnS1) [ T . We thus compute the relative volume, in ¢S, of
the volume de¯ned by the equation:
n + 1
n
¼S1n1 + ¼(SnS1)[T · 1 : (13)
The proportion, in ¢S, of this last volume is (apply Fubini's theorem), denoting u = ¼S1n1 and
v = ¼(SnS1)[T :
(S ¡ 1)!
Z n
n+1
u=0
un¡1
(n ¡ 1)!
ÃZ 1¡ n+1n u
v=0
vS¡n¡2
(S ¡ n ¡ 2)! dv
!
du ;
which is equal to
µ
n
n + 1
¶n
. This last ratio is 1 ¡ ½S;K . It is a minimal ratio of shareholders that
will oppose to any change of production plan within each ¯rm k, since at the equilibrium, everybody is
allocated positive shares of the ¯rms so that everybody gets the right to vote.
This proves the Proposition for the p0, p1 and a0-governances.
For the a1-governance, the argument developped in Lemma 3 still holds to characterize the best way
to challenge the status quo within a ¯rm. Therefore, for k · m, one has to compute (for ¯rm 1, the
same result will hold for other ¯rms) the measure of the volume de¯ned by inequality (13), weighted by
¼S1 = 1 ¡ v (ignoring the constant term S(n+1)K which will disappear in the normalization). It is
(S ¡ 1)!
Z n
n+1
u=0
un¡1
(n ¡ 1)!
ÃZ 1¡ n+1n u
v=0
vS¡n¡2
(S ¡ n ¡ 2)! (1 ¡ v) dv
!
du ;
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which is, after standard computations, equal to
n + 1
S
µ
n
n + 1
¶n
: (The same result holds true if one
weights by ¼Sk instead of ¼S1 .) This has to be normalized by the volume of ¢S weighted by ¼S1 = u0,
which gives Z 1
u0=0
u0 (u
0)n
n!
(1 ¡ u0)S¡n¡2
(S ¡ n ¡ 2)! du
0 = n + 1
S
:
Therefore the relative volume we are looking for is the same as in the one person-one vote governance.
For all k ¸ m + 1, the volume de¯ned by inequality (13), weighted by ¼Tk is equal to n
S
µ
n
n + 1
¶n
:
Therefore, if one takes the density ~µk = ¼Tk + 1(n+1)K ¼
S one gets 1
S
³
n +
m
K
´µ n
n + 1
¶n
: This has to
be normalized by the volume of ¢S weighted by the same density, which is
1
S
³
n +
m
K
´
: 2
Proof of Theorem 2: For the existence of s{MSPEa1, we consider the same family of hyperplanes
hÁiÁ2SS¡2 as the one de¯ned for the a0-governance. For each Á, ¯x a orthonormed basis (e`Á)S¡2`=1 which
moves continuously with Á. Therefore e`¡Á = ¡e`Á, for all Á, all `. Denote CÁ the subset of hÁi of optimal
consumptions xÁ(¼) for all types ¼ (for a given multiplan YÁ continuously depending on Á such that
[YÁ;1K ; µÁ] be a PE satisfying the Pareto criterion, and of course hYÁi = hÁi). One has for xÁ 2 CÁ,
xÁ =
P
` x
`
Áe
`
Á.
For xÁ 2 CÁ, let f£0+Á (xÁ) [resp. f£0¡Á (xÁ)] denote the density obtained from f ¢
P
k µ
0
k by aggregating
all types ¼ 2 hÁi+ [resp. ¼ 2 hÁi¡] such that xÁ(¼) = xÁ. One has for all k, 1 · k · K ¡ 1,Z
hÁi¤
f(¼)µk(¼)d¼ =
Z
CÁ
f£0¤Á (xÁ)~µk;Á(xÁ)dxÁ ; (14)
for ¤ = + or ¡, and where ~µk;Á(xÁ) = µk(¼)=P` µ0` (¼) for all ¼ such that xÁ(¼) = xÁ.
Consider the S ¡ 2 mappings (¹`)S¡2`=1 on SS¡2 de¯ned by
¹`(Á) =
Z
CÁ
x`Á[f£
0+
Á ¡ f£0¡Á ](xÁ) dxÁ : (15)
They all satisfy the symmetry property: ¹`(¡Á) = ¡¹`(Á). Indeed, given that e`¡Á = ¡e`Á, for all Á
x¡Á = ® ¡ xÁ for some ¯xed ®Á, from which we get, trhough an obvious change of coordinates:
¹`(¡Á) =
Z
CÁ
(®`Á ¡ x`Á)[f£0+¡Á ¡ f£0¡¡Á](®Á ¡ xÁ)[¡dxÁ] =
Z
CÁ
(®`Á ¡ x`Á)[f£0+Á ¡ f£0¡Á ](xÁ)dxÁ
because obviously f£0+¡Á(x¡Á) = f£
0¡
Á (xÁ). And we know that for all Á,
Z
CÁ
®`Á[f£
0+
Á ¡f£0¡Á ](xÁ)dxÁ =
0 since hÁi divides ¢S into two pieces of equal measure with respect to the distribution f ¢ £0.
Given that mappings (¹`)S¡2`=1 satisfy the above described symmetry property, we get, by an indirect
corollary of the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, that they possess a common zero. Denote it Á0. Hence for all `,
1 · ` · S ¡ 2, one has: Z
C(Á0)
x`Á0f£
0+
Á0 (xÁ0) dxÁ0 =
Z
C(Á0)
x`Á0f£
0¡
Á0 (xÁ0) dxÁ0 :
Lastly, one observes (as shown in the proof of Theorem 3) that for all k, 1 · k · K ¡ 1, ~µk(xÁ0) is
an a±ne function of xÁ0 . Therefore, from equation (14), we get the result: Á0 de¯nes a PE [YÁ0 ;1K ; µÁ0 ]
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that divides ¢ ¡ S into two pieces of equal measure with respect to the distributions f ¢ µk;Á0 , for all k,
1 · k · K ¡ 1, and for f ¢ Pk µk;Á0 , hence also for f ¢ µK;Á0 . 2
Proof of Theorem 3: The proof goes through three steps. The ¯rst step to prove that the relevant
PE (Y;1K ;£) should generate a subspace hY i that contains the center of gravity, ¼g = (¼sg)Ss=1, of the
distribution f ¢ Pk µ0k (denoted f£0 in the sequel). The second step to show that among all multiplans
Y such that hY i contains ¼g, there exists one that contains the center of gravity, ¼g;k, of the distribution
f ¢ µk, for all k. The third step shows that the density f ¢ µk is º-concave for all k.
Step 1: The following statement is proved here: Consider a PE (Y;1K ;£) such that, for all k, hY i contains
¼g;k, then it contains ¼g.
Indeed, by de¯nition:
8s; ¼sg;k = 1¡0k
Z
¢S
¼s f(¼) µk(¼) d¼ ;
and one can easily check that ¼g is the barycenter of (¼g;k)Kk=1 with weights
µ
¡0k
¡0
¶K
k=1
, with ¡0 =
KX
k=1
¡0k,
i.e., ¼g =
1
¡0
KX
k=1
¡0k ¼g;k. Therefore, a relevant multiplan Y is such that ¼g 2 hY i.
Step 2: We show now that among all multiplans Y such that hY i contains ¼g, there exist at least one
that contains ¼g;k, for all k. This will go through two steps. The ¯rst step to prove that there exists
S ¡ 1 independent stable directions in h¢Si; the de¯nition of a stable direction v follows: consider the
distribution x ¢ f£0 over ¢S where x(¼) is the abscissa of the orthogonal projection of ¼ on the direction
of v, denote ¼g(v) the center of gravity of this distribution, v is stable if the vector
¡!
¼g¼g(v) is colinear to
v. The second step shows that any subspace containing K ¡ 1 of these independent stable directions can
be spanned by a K-multiplan Y such that hY i contains ¼g;k, for all k.
Step 2.1: Stable directions. De¯ne, for all state of nature t, the vector u(t) 2 h¢Si, with ut(t) = ¡1 and
us(t) = 1=(S ¡ 1) for s 6= t. The orthogonal projection of ¢S on the direction de¯ned by u(t) is only
function of ¼t, i.e., all ¼ 2 ¢S with same t-th coordinate project on the same point on any line spanned
by u(t). Denote ¼g(t) = [¼sg(t)]Ss=1 the center of gravity of the distribution ¼tf£0(¼); by de¯nition:
8s; ¼sg(t) = 1¡0¼tg
Z
¢S
¼s ¼t f£0(¼) d¼ :
One immediatly gets the following property:
SX
t=1
¼tg ¼g(t) = ¼g; i.e. ; ¼g is the barycenter of the family [¼g(t)]
S
t=1 with weights (¼
t
g)
S
t=1 : (16)
The independent family of vectors [u(t)]S¡1t=1 spans h¢Si. Consider a vector v =
S¡1X
t=1
vt u(t), and
denote hvi the direction it spans in h¢Si. We have the following property:
8(¼; ¼0); if
S¡1X
t=1
vt¼t =
S¡1X
t=1
vt¼0t then ¼; ¼0 project orthogonally on the same point on hvi : (17)
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Indeed, one then has:
!
¼¼0 ¢ v =
S¡1X
t=1
vt u(t) ¢
!
¼¼0, with u(t) ¢ !¼¼0= ¡ S
S ¡ 1(¼
0t ¡ ¼t); therefore !¼¼0 ¢ v =
¡ S
S ¡ 1
S¡1X
t=1
vt(¼0t ¡ ¼t) = 0.
Consider the linear function x(¼) =
S¡1X
t=1
vt¼t. Property (17) states that the orthogonal projection
of ¼ on hvi is only a function of x(¼). Denote ¼g(v) the center of gravity of the distribution x ¢ f£0;
standard computations give:
¼g(v) =
X
t<S
µ
vt¼tgP
s<S vs¼sg
¶
¼g(t):
We are now looking for the vectors v such that
¡!
¼g¼g(v) is colinear to v. From the last equation we get
that
¡!
¼g¼g(v) is colinear (for a v in general position) to the vector
"X
t<S
vt¼tg(¼
s
g(t) ¡ ¼sg)
#S
s=1
.
Denote ast = ¼tg(¼sg(t)¡¼sg). Then
¡!
¼g¼g(v) is colinear to v, if and only if there exists ¸ 6= 0 such that
for all s, X
t<S
astvt = ¸
X
t<S
us(t)vt :
Obviously, if the latter equation is satis¯ed for s = 1; : : : ; S ¡ 1, it is also satis¯ed for s = S. Therefore,
denoting A, resp. U , the (S ¡ 1){square matrix (ast)S¡1s;t=1, resp. (us(t))S¡1s;t=1, denoting w be the vector
with coordinates (vt)S¡1t=1 in the original basis, the following property holds:
¡!
¼g¼g(v) is colinear to v if and only if Aw is colinear to Uw : (18)
One has to look for the eigenvectors (and eigenvalues) of the product matrix: (¡U)¡1A, and prove that
they are all real and that (¡U)¡1A is diagonalizable. The two matrices A and ¡U have the following
properties:
² A is real symmetric (therefore Hermitian) and for all s, Pt<S ast > 0. (Indeed, by property (16)P
t·S ast = 0 and obviously ass > 0, ast < 0 for s 6= t.) In fact, it is a variance-covariance matrix.
² ¡U is real symmetric; its inverse is:
(¡U)¡1 = S ¡ 1
S
0BBBBB@
2 1 : : : 1
1
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1
1 : : : 1 2
1CCCCCA ;
which is obviously a positive de¯nite Hermitian matrix.
And one knows that the product of a positive de¯nite matrix and a Hermitian matrix is a diagonalizable
matrix, all of whose eigenvalues are real (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson (1985), Theorem page 465).
As a remark, one can easily check that if the distribution f ¢ Pk µ0k is uniform, A = ¡ S ¡ 1S2(S + 1)U
therefore all directions are stable: whatever the subspace going through ¼g, it contains ¼g;k for all k.
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Step 2.2: Fix K · S. Pick K ¡ 1 of the preceding stable directions: V = (vj)K¡1k=1 , with for all j:
vj =
S¡1X
t=1
vtj u(t), and denote hV i the subspace they span in h¢Si. Property (17) generalizes:
8(¼; ¼0); if 8j
S¡1X
t=1
vtj¼
t =
S¡1X
t=1
vtj¼
0t then ¼; ¼0 project orthogonally on the same point in H(V ) : (19)
Consider for all j < K ¡ 1, xj(¼) =
S¡1X
t=1
vtj¼
t. Property (19) states that the orthogonal projection of ¼ on
hV i is only a function of [xj(¼)]K¡1j=1 . Denote ¼g(j) the center of gravity of the distribution xj(¼)f£0(¼).
Take a PE (Y;1K ;£) such that hY i ´ hV i. A direct consequence of Property (19) is that for all k,
1 · k · K, ¹µk(¼)
µ
=
µk(¼)P
` µ
0
` (¼)
¶
will be an a±ne function of [xj(¼)]K¡1j=1 :
¹µk(¼) = ®k +
K¡1X
j=1
¯kj xj(¼) :
Standard computations give:
¼g;k =
1
¡0k
Z
¢S
¼ ¹µk(¼) f£0(¼) d¼
=
®k
®k +
X
j
¯kj °j
¼g +
K¡1X
j=1
¯kj °j
®k +
X
j
¯kj °j
¼g(j) ;
where °j =
P
t v
t
j¼tg. Therefore ¼g;j is in hV i ´ hY i which ends this step.
Step 3: The third step is to show that the density f ¢ µk is º-concave for all k. This comes immediately
from the fact that f(¼) ¢ µk(¼) = f£0(¼)¹µk(¼) where, as seen before, ¹µk(¼) is an a±ne function of ¼,
hence is º-concave for º · 1. 2
Proof of Claim 2: For the sake of lightness of the notation we consider m = K. Suppose the K ¯rms
announce a production multi-plan Y = (yk)Kk=1, such that hY i = h¹Y i (as de¯ned by (5)), and such that
(Y;1K ; µ) is a PE (allowed by Lemma 1). The identity x(¼) =
P
k µk(¼) yk = ¹x(¼) =
P
k
¹µk(¼) ¹yk allows
to focus on (¹Y ; ¹µ).
The utility levels of agent ¼ on feasible consumptions is:
P
k ¼
SkvSk [¹µk=(n+1)] with vSk ´ Ps2Sk vs.
This yields the optimal portfolio (¹µk)k as a function of (¼Sk)Kk=1: (¹µk)k = V [(¼
Sk)k], where V is one-
to-one. Indeed, for all j, the ¯rst order conditions of the maximization program give ¼jDvSj (¹µj) =
constant; hence, since DvSj (¹µj) > 0, V [(¼Sk)k] = V [(¼
0Sk)k] =) (¼Sk)k = (¼0Sk)k). As examples, for
the log-linear case vs = ln for all s, V is the identity: V [(¼Sk)k] = (¼Sk)k. If vs(x) = x¹ with 0 < ¹ < 1,
V [(¼Sk)k] = [(¼Sk)1=1¡¹=
P
k(¼
Sk)1=1¡¹]k .
Fix a vector of shares (¹µk)Kk=1 in ¢K . Then all agents with type in P¡1[V ¡1(¹µk)] (where P is de¯ned
in Lemma 3) have the same portfolio, hence the same optimal consumption under the assumtion of the
canonical case. Moreover P¡1[V ¡1(¹µk)] is, as stated in Lemma 3, a cartesian product of simplices of
dimension n. Consider the cutting proposed in Lemma 3, through a change
³
¡²; ²S¡1 ; : : : ; ²S¡1
´
in the
production plan of a ¯rm. We know it does not divide the parameter space ¢S through a hyperplane.
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But it does divide P¡1[V ¡1(¹µk)] though a hyperplane, as unevenly as possible with respect to the uniform
distribution of most prefered alternative f ± y¤, and the biggest piece gets the same proportion of the
(n=n+1)n of the volume of this base simplex. The distribution f ±y¤ being uniform, this last ratio holds
for the whole set ¢S.
One can ¯nally check (for Proposition 2) that any proposed change (that can be taken orthogonal
to h¹Y i), will always put ¼ and ¼¿ (who always select the same portfolio and optimal consumption) in
di®erent positions: if it impairs the welfare of one, it improves the welfare of the other. 2
Appendix C : Proofs of Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4: The ¯rst step of the proof of Proposition 1 still goes through. The only
di®erence is in the equilibrium equation for prices which should be computed for the new density dc in
the case of the example based on the multiplan ~Y de¯ned by equations (7). It is
Z
¢S
µk(¼) f(¼) d¼ =
(cS ¡ 1)!
Z
¢S
1
K
dc(¼) d¼, for all k. For k · m, one gets:
Z
¢S
¼Sk dc(¼) d¼ =
Z 1
0
¼
¼c(n+1)¡1
[c(n + 1) ¡ 1]!
(1 ¡ ¼)c(S¡n¡1)¡1
[c(S ¡ n ¡ 1) ¡ 1]! d¼ =
c(n + 1)
cS
=
(n + 1)
S
;
and of course
Z
¢S
dc(¼) d¼ = 1 ; hence the result.
One has now to check that it is stable for the ½cS;K-majority rule under the p0, p1 and a0-governances.
For that, given that Lemma 2 and 3 are still valid, we compute, as in Step 3 in the proof of Proposition
1, the relative volume, in ¢S endowed with the density dc, of the set de¯ned by inequality (13) which is,
denoting u = ¼S1n1 and v = ¼(SnS1)[T :
(cS ¡ 1)!
Z n
n+1
u=0
ucn¡1
(cn ¡ 1)!
ÃZ 1¡ n+1n u
v=0
vc(S¡n¡1)¡1
[c(S ¡ n ¡ 1) ¡ 1]!
(1 ¡ u ¡ v)c¡1
(c ¡ 1)! dv
!
du ;
which is equal, after standard integration by parts, to 1 ¡ ½cS;K .
As far as the a1-governance is concerned, one has to compute the volume of the set de¯ned by
inequality (13), endowed with the density dc, and moreover weighted by ¼S1 (the same result would hold
for any other ¯rm). This is
(cS ¡ 1)!
Z n
n+1
u=0
ucn¡1
(cn ¡ 1)!
ÃZ 1¡ n+1n u
v=0
vc(S¡n¡1)¡1
[c(S ¡ n ¡ 1) ¡ 1]!
(1 ¡ u ¡ v)c¡1
(c ¡ 1)! (1 ¡ v) dv
!
du ;
which (we cut this double integral into two pieces by distributing with respect to 1 ¡ v) is equal to
(1 ¡ ½cS;K) + c(S ¡ n ¡ 1)cS (1 ¡ ½
c
S;K) = (1 ¡ ½cS;K)n + 1S . On the other hand, the volume of ¢S endowed
with the density dc and moreover weighted by ¼S1 is
n + 1
S
. Hence the result. 2
Proof of Corollary 2: This goes either by noticing that, for n = 1, for all c,
1 ¡ ½cS;K =
µ
1
2
¶c c¡1X
j=0
Ã
c ¡ 1 + j
j
!µ
1
2
¶j
=
1
2
;
or by reproducing straightforwardly the proof of Proposition 2 given in Section 4. 2
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Proof of Corollary 3: This goes by noticing that
µ
n
n + 1
¶cn c¡1X
j=0
Ã
nc ¡ 1 + j
j
!µ
1
n + 1
¶j
; de-
creases toward
Ã
c¡1X
i=0
ci
i!
!
e¡c, when n tends toward in¯nity. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: It goes through three steps. The ¯rst step is the construction of a PE (Y^ ;1K ; µ^)
based on the multiplan ( ¹Y ); the second step proves that this PE is a ¿S;K{MSPE; the third step proves
that ¿S;K is the min-max majority.
Step 1: Suppose the K ¯rms announce the production multiplan Y^ (®) = [y^k(®)]Kk=1, for ® 2 R:
for k · m; y^k(®) = (® + 1) ¹yk ¡ ®K ¡ m
KX
j=m+1
¹yj ; and for k ¸ m + 1; y^k = ¹yk : (20)
Hence, as in the proof of Proposition 1, for s 2 Sk, one has:
if s 2 Tk; k ¸ m + 1; then
KX
j=1
µj y^sj =
1
n
µ
µk ¡ ®K ¡ mµ
S
¶
if s 2 Sk; k · m; then
KX
j=1
µj y^sj =
® + 1
n + 1
µk
Let ¼(k) = max
s2Sk (or Tk)
¼s, the utility function (10), with ¼0(k) =
(
(n + 1)¼(k) if k · m
n¼(k) if k ¸ m + 1 , can
be rewritten:
U^¼;¡1[µ(¼)] = min
k
24µ ®µk
¼0(k)
¶
k·m
;
Ã
µk ¡ ®K¡mµS
¼0(k)
!
k¸m+1
35 :
First order conditions at the maximum entails that all arguments of U^¼ are equal: there exists a real c(¼)
such that,
k · m µ^k = 1® + 1 ¼
0(k) c(¼) (21)
k ¸ m + 1 µ^k =
0@¼0(k) + 1
K ¡ m
®
® + 1
mX
j=1
¼0(j)
1A c(¼) (22)
We are looking for a value of ® such that, at the equilibrium, qk = 1, all k. As argued in the canonical
case, since we consider homethetic preferences, there is no loss of generality in considering distributions of
initial shares such that for all ¼,
PK
k=1 µ
0
k(¼) = 1 (together with the price normalization
PK
k=1 qk = K).
Hence, if q = 1K , one gets:
c(¼) =
1PK
k=1 ¼0(k)
: (23)
The question then is whether there exists a value of ® such that for all k, 1 · k · K,Z
¢S
f(¼) µ^k(¼) d¼ =
Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼ :
For k · m, this last equation can be rewritten:
1
® + 1
Z
¢S
f(¼)
¼0(k)PK
j=1 ¼0(j)
d¼ =
Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼ =
1
K
; (24)
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this last equality being a direct consequence of the fact that
Z
¢S
f(¼) µ0k(¼) d¼ = ¡
0
k, independent of
k, and that for all ¼,
PK
k=1 µ
0
k(¼) = 1. This de¯nes obviously a value ®^ for the parameter ® (which does
not depend on k, because of the symmetry of the m ¯rst assets). And then one can easily check that
(24) entails equilibrium on the markets for shares of ¯rms k, k ¸ m + 1.
What remains to be checked is that ® ¸ 0 so that, at equilibrium, everybody is allocated positive
shares of all ¯rms. One obviously has, for all k · m:
¼0(k)PK
j=1 ¼0(j)
¸ ¼(k)PK
j=1 ¼(j)
;
therefore
®^ = K
Z
¢S
f(¼)
¼0(1)PK
j=1 ¼0(j)
d¼ ¡ 1 ¸ K
Z
¢S
f(¼)
¼(1)PK
j=1 ¼(j)
d¼ ¡ 1
and since
1 =
KX
k=1
Z
¢S
f(¼)
¼(k)PK
j=1 ¼(j)
d¼ =|{z}
by symmetry
K
Z
¢S
f(¼)
¼(1)PK
j=1 ¼(j)
d¼ ;
the result obtains. Fix ® = ®^ in the sequel.
Finally, one gets the following observation, with for all k, ¹µk =
¼0(k)PK
j=1 ¼0(j)
.
Observation 3 One has:
KX
k=1
µ^k =
KX
k=1
¹µk = 1 ; (25)
and:
KX
k=1
µ^k y^k =
KX
k=1
¹µk ¹yk : (26)
Step 2: We have proved (for ® = ®^) that (Y^ ;1K ; µ^) is a PE. We have to prove that it is ¿S;K-majority
stable. As for the canonical case, from the concavity of the agents preferences, for a ¯xed zk, then
zk(¸) = ¸y^k + (1 ¡ ¸)zk will get a larger or equal fraction than zk of shareholders and shares against y^k.
Therefore, in looking for PY^ ;µ^(y^k) or AY^ ;µ^(y^k), we can focus on alternative production plan zk arbitrarily
close to y^k. Given Observation 3, it is equivalent to take any zk arbitrarily close to ¹yk
Take zk = ¹yk + ²k with ²k = (²sk)
S
s=1,
PS
s=1 ²
s
k = 0. Suppose ²
1
k < 0: zk reduces the payo® of ¹yk in the
¯rst state of the world. Necessarily, for all agents such that ¼(1) = ¼1, the utility level decreases. Indeed,
at the PE, the utility level of such an agent is
¹µ1
(n + 1)¼1
, and U¼;¡1[¹x+ ¹µk ²k] is by de¯nition of the min
inferior to
¹µ1
(n + 1)¼1
+
¹µk
¼1
²1k. Take a state of nature s such that s 2 Sj (or Tj); then all shareholders ¼
such that ¼(j) = ¼s will strictly oppose to any change ²k such that ²sk < 0.
Therefore, in order to ¯nd a best challenger against the status quo ¹yk within ¯rm k, one has to
decrease the payo®s in the smallest number of states of the world, hence only one: Fix ¹s such that ¹s 2 S¹j
(w.l.o.g.) and consider ²sk > 0 for all s 6= ¹s, and ²¹sk < 0 . The change ²k imapirs the welfare of shareholders
¼ such that ¼(¹j) = ¼¹s, but on the other hand, for ²k su±ciently small, it improves the welfare of all other
agents. Indeed, consider an agent ¼ such that ¼(¹j) 6= ¼¹s. Then in states s 6= ¹s, its consumption increases
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by
¹µk
¼s
²sk; and in state ¹s its consumption decreases by
¹µk
¼¹s
²¹sk. But since ¼(¹j) > ¼¹s, for ²k small enough,
one has: ¹µk
¼¹s
1
n + 1
+
¹µk
¼¹s
²¹sk >
¹µk
¼(j)
1
n + 1
+
¹µk
¼(j)
²s^k ;
where s^ is such that ¼(¹j) = ¼s^. Hence, even after the change ²k, the minimum consumption still does
not occur for ¹s, but for another state s in which the consumption increases.
Therefore the most challenging way to threaten the status quo is to decrease the payo® of ¹yk for
only one state of the world and improving its payo® in all others. In this case the shareholders opposing
the change are such that ¼(¹j) = ¼¹s. Given the symmetry of the density f , their proportion is obviously
n
n+1 if ¹s · m(n + 1) (i.e., ¹s 2 S¹j for some ¹j · m), and n¡1n if ¹s ¸ m(n + 1) + 1 (i.e., ¹s 2 T¹j for some
¹j ¸ m + 1). Hence PY^ ;µ0(y^k) = PY^ ;µ^(y^k) = nn+1 with n =
¥S¡1
K
¦
. Finally, given the symmetry, at the
considered symmetric PE, of the shares, one immediately gets AY^ ;µ0(y^k) = AY^ ;µ^(y^k) =
n
n+1 .
Step 3: We have proven that there exists a ¿S;K-MSPE for all governances. Finally we have to prove
that ¿S;K is the min-max.This easy proof is left to the reader: take a non-symmetric Y and `attack' it
the usual way from the central part of ¢S . 2
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